In this paper we abstract from the usual gains and costs of decentralization (e.g. preference matching, spillovers and economies of scale). Instead we compare the political accountability of decentralized governments relative to centralized ones when there is a risk of "bad" governance. We study both the selection and incentive e®ects of accountability. A key aspect of centralization is to make the politician answerable to multiple constituencies subject to a common budget constraint. Our main¯ndings are that (a) when politicians di®er in competence, decentralization unambiguously dominates; and (b) when politicians di®er in honesty, decentralization and centralization have con°icting accountability e®ects (when one provides better discipline, the other gives better selection). The analysis then identi¯es the circumstances under which centralization may increase voter welfare. The more general lesson that we can draw is that di®erent institutional forms give rise to di®erent information to the voters on which electoral accountabiltiy can be based. Therefore they di®er on how e®ective elections can be in disciplining and selecting policymakers.
Introduction
Fiscal decentralization, the allocation of tax and spending powers to lower levels of government, is now an established policy objective, in many developed and developing countries. Moreover, it is actively promoted as a development strategy by organizations such as the World Bank (Azfar et al.(2001) , World Bank(2000) ). The usual advantages that are claimed for decentralization that one can¯nd in the literature include the following (Azfar et al.(2001) , Oates(1999) ). First, decentralization is claimed to improve allocative e±ciency, in the sense that the goods provided by governments in localities will be better matched to the preferences of the residents of those localities. This is sometimes known as the preference-matching argument. There is now a large theoretical literature evaluating the preference-matching argument. 1 There are also few more recent empirical papers.
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Second, decentralization is argued to increase the accountability of government. In the literature, this term is used in rather a broad sense, and refers to electoral rules and other institutional mechanisms that constrain the rent-seeking activities of o±ce holders, such as taking bribes, favouring of particular interest groups, and insu±cient innovation and e®ort. Interestingly, in this case, the lead has been taken by empirical researchers: there are now a number of cross-sectional and panel studies that show that across countries, measures of¯scal decentralization may sometimes be negatively correlated with outcomes associated with low accountability, such as corruption and poor governance (e.g. Huther and Shah(1998)), Mello and Barenstein(2001) , Fissman and Gatti(2000) , Triesman(2002) ).
However, accountability is notoriously di±cult to pin down precisely, and perhaps re°ecting this, there have been rather few attempts to precisely de¯ne accountability, and analyse theoretically how the degree of accountability varies with¯scal (de)-centralization. Notable exceptions are Seabright(1996) and Bardhan and Mookherjee(2000) . 3 Both of these contributions, while important steps forward, have their limitations. The¯rst two papers have models where the government has to make an abstract policy choice (a point on the real line), and cannot capture one of the key features of¯scal centralization, namely 1 See for example, Alesina and Spolare(1997), Besley and Coate(2003) , Bolton and Roland(1997) and Cremer and Palfrey(1996) , Ellingsen(1998) , Gilbert and Picard(1996) , Lockwood(2002) , Oates(1972) ,
Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf(2002), Wallis and Oates(1988) . 2 Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2002) , Faguet(2004) . 3 We should also mention the important contributions of Besley and Smart (2003) and Belle°amme and Hindriks (2003) , who focus on the impact of competition between jurisdictions (tax or yardstick) on the performance of politicans in a two-period agency framework. However, they do not compare centralisation and decentralisation: their baseline case is decentralisation without competition.
that the policy-maker faces a single budget constraint, where local public goods are funded by a national tax. 4 One of the central contributions of our paper is to argue that this institutional feature of centralization changes the incentives for a "bad" incumbent to pool with a good incumbent. These contributions are both discussed in more detail in Section 7 below. This paper takes a somewhat di®erent approach to modelling accountability. We consider a two-jurisdiction, two-period political agency model of the type pioneered by Rogo®(1990) , and developed subsequently by many others. 5 In each period and each jurisdiction, the elected politician provides a local public good¯nanced by taxes. At the end of the¯rst period, the incumbent politician¯ghts an election against a challenger. There are just two di®erences between decentralization and centralization. First, with decentralization, there are two politicians, one in each region, whereas with centralization, there is a single politician. Second, with centralization, the tax rate that funds public good provision is assumed the same in the two regions -tax uniformity. 6 Politiciansboth incumbent and challenger -may be "good" or "bad". We look at two possibilities: the bad politician may be incompetent or dishonest. In this set-up, elections provide accountability in two senses. First, they allow voters to de-select bad incumbents (selection e®ects ). Second, the selection e®ect provides an incentive for incumbents to change their behavior in order to increase the probability of re-election (incentive or discipline e®ects). The focus of this paper is on how centralization a®ects these measures of accountability. Our main results are as follows. First, in the competence case (where politicians have a high or low expected cost of providing the public good), with centralization, it is unambiguously more likely that an incompetent incumbent will imitate, or "pool" with a competent one, in order to be re-elected. This is because to get re-elected the bad incumbents must produce the same record as a competent politician in both regions, while with decentralization a good record at home su±ces to gain re-election. However, pooling is bad both in terms of selection and incentive. The bad selection e®ect is obvious: with pooling, it is more likely that an incompetent incumbent is re-elected. The incentive 4 Persson and Tabellini(2000), Chapter 9.1 have a two-period version of the Seabright model with explicit modelling of¯scal policy, but again they impose the assumption of separate budget constraints. Their interpretation of this model is that it allows comparison of majoritarian and proportional electoral rules in an agency framework.
5 Important contributions include Harrington (1993) , Hess and Orphanides (1995) , Besley and Case (1995) , Coate and Morris(1995) and Drazen (2000b) , 6 The¯rst feature is the basic or de¯ning one of¯scal centraliation. The second feature, tax uniformity, is a near universal feature empirically: with very few exceptions, national tax codes do not di®erentiate between regions. Tax uniformity is discussed in more detail below.
e®ect is also bad as the incompetent incumbent distorts local public good provision (in fact, over-provides the public good) in order to imitate the good incumbent. So, the conclusion concurs with the conventional wisdom: centralization unambiguously reduces accountability, and indeed lowers voter welfare. 7
In the honesty case, (where honest politicians are motivated only by voter welfare, and dishonest politicians only by rents diverted from tax revenue) the picture is more complex, and more interesting. First, with centralization the incumbent must pool in both regions or neither, and this constraint gives di®erent incentives to pool in the centralized case. So depending on parameter values, centralization can make pooling more or less likely. Moreover, now, pooling (relative to separating) has a good incentive e®ect, although the selection e®ect is of course weakened by pooling. Speci¯cally, in order to pool, the incumbent must limit the amount that is stolen from the public purse. So, centralization always has an ambiguous e®ect on accountability overall: when it leads to more pooling, it decreases the selection e®ect, but improves incentives, and when it leads to less pooling, the opposite is true. Not surprisingly, therefore, centralization may increase or decrease voter welfare.
The question then arises as to which institutional feature of centralization (a single policy-maker or tax uniformity) is driving these results. The answer depends crucially on what information voters have at the time when they vote. If voters can observe only thē scal policy choices in their own jurisdictions, then tax uniformity drives the results. If, on the other hand, voters can observe the¯scal policy choices in both jurisdictions, then the fact of a single policy-maker drives the results. That is, it makes no di®erence to the equilibrium outcome whether the policy-maker can choose separate taxes in the two jurisdictions, or is constrained to a uniform tax.
The intuition is the following. A di®erence between centralization and decentralization only arises when regions are asymmetric ex post -i.e. when the cost of producing the public good is high in one region and low in the other. In that situation, with non-uniform taxes, and limited voter information, a bad incumbent can pool (i.e. imitate the good politician) in the low-cost region, and separate in the high-cost region, thus only losing the votes of residents of the high-cost region, and thus having a higher probability of re-election. This possibility to pool "selectively" gives the incumbent the same incentive to pool as under decentralization. With uniform taxes, and/or voter information about scal policy in the other region, such selective pooling is not possible: the incumbent must pool in both regions or neither, and this constraint gives di®erent incentives to pool 7 The measure of voter welfare is the expected present value of utility. in the centralized case.
A¯nal contribution of this paper is to investigate how the results are a®ected by the introduction of competition between jurisdictions. We focus on the case of yardstick competition, with politicians who di®er in benevolence (honest or dishonest). 8 We show that if there is a pooling equilibrium with yardstick competition, decentralization always yields higher voter welfare if the correlation in the (random) cost of producing the public good is su±ciently high across the two jurisdictions. If on the other hand, there is a hybrid equilibrium with yardstick competition in which politicians play mixed strategy between pooling and separating, correlation in the cost of producing the public good makes decentralization less likely to dominate.
The layout of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 presents the competence case and proceeds to welfare comparison between centralization and decentralization. Section 4 presents the benevolence case and describes the di®erent equilibrium con¯gurations before undertaking the welfare comparisons. Section 5 studies the welfare e®ects of yardstick comparison. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the related literature.
The Model

Preliminaries
There are two time periods t = 1; 2 and two regions i = a; b: In each region in each time period, a politician makes a decisions about taxation and public good provision. Moreover, at the end of period 1, there is an election in which voters choose between the incumbent and a challenger, having observed only¯rst-period¯scal policy: With decentralization, there are two politicians: one in each region. With centralization, there is one politician.
In each region, there are a continuum of measure 1 of identical voters who derive
t from a regional public good g i t and a private good x i t in period t: All agents have an endowment of the private good, normalized to unity. The public good is¯nanced by a lump-sum tax ¿ i t ; so that utility of the typical voter is H(g
The tax can also be interpreted as an income tax at rate ¿ i t on income of unity. It is assumed that 0 · ¿ i t · r; where r · 1 is a maximum feasible tax rate. Both voters and politicians have the same discount factor, 0 < ± < 1: 8 The e®ect of yardstick competition in the competence model is less interesting since decentralization already dominates and observing¯scal policy in one region does not bring any useful information about the politician type in the other region (unless we assume correlated politician types across regions).
In each region in each time period, the unit cost c i t of producing the public good from the private good can take on one of two values: c As in Rogo®(1990) , we assume a mechanism by which a¯rst-period bad incumbent can "hide" the true cost of public good provision from the voters.
12 So, we assume that in the¯rst period, the incumbent can borrow freely on the international capital market at interest rate 1 ± ¡ 1, and so in the second period, he must pay back $ 1 ± for every $ borrowed.
The borrowing is not observable by voters.
Benevolence. A "good" politician derives utility only from the welfare of the voters in his jurisdiction: in particular, he maximises the sum or average of these utilities. A bad politician cares only about rent diversion. Either type is equally competent in producing the public good. The cost of the public good is high in either region and period with probability q.
A Benchmark
Note that in this model, there is an agency problem between voters and the incumbent: the former can only imperfectly control the behavior of the latter through electoral incentives. Note also that in setting up this model, we have abstracted from the usual features that generate a di®erence between centralization and decentralization in the established literature: there are no spillovers between regions, voters do not di®er in tastes for the public good, either within or between regions, and the (distribution of) cost of producing the cost is the same under either institutional form. Also, by taking a¯xed number of incumbents and challengers, we assume away free entry and rule out the district magnitude e®ect bias in favor centralization (that larger electoral districts lower barriers to entry and favor competition improving political discipline and selection).
13 So, the di®erence in outcome between centralization and decentralization is entirely due to the di®erence in the extent to which the voters can control, or hold accountable, the incumbent, in the two cases. To see this, it is helpful to consider the benchmark where there is no agency problem i.e. where politicians are "good" with probability 1. In this case, it is clear that there is an equilibrium where the incumbent will always be re-elected, 14 and in either region and 12 Otherwise, given that voters can observe both public good provision and the tax rate, the only possible equilibrium would be a separating one with no distortions in public good supply i.e. no agency "problem" in which case centralization and decentralization are again equivalent. 13 The district magnitude e®ect is related to the idea suggested by Myerson (1993) that electoral rules promoting the entry of many candidates protect voters against corruption in a better way. Myerson (1999) gives overview of the performance of di®erent electoral systems and Persson et al (2001) give evidence of the district magnitude e®ect. 14 There can be other equilibria where the incumbent is no re-elected, as all voters are always indi®erent period, the incumbent will provide the public good e±ciently, conditional on cost c L or c H . This is true whether there is centralization or decentralization. Of course, e±cient provision is g k ; k = L; H is implicitly de¯ned by the Samuelson rule H 0 (g k ) = c k : Finally, as the distribution of costs is the same under decentralization and centralization, it follows that public good provision and therefore expected voter welfare must also be the same.
Relation to the Literature
The model of competence is based on Rogo® (1990) , but with some changes that make analysis of the model simpler. In particular, the assumption of international borrowing to "hide" the true resource cost of the public good is an alternative to Rogo®'s infrastructure public good which is consumed with one period delay. The other key di®erence to Rogo® (1990) is that we assume that if voters believe the incumbent and challenger to be equally competent, they will vote for the incumbent 15 . The model of benevolence is essentially that of Besley and Smart (2003) . However, as emphasized in the introduction, they did not consider centralization in this setting. 
So voters prefer to vote out bad incumbent if possible (EW < W L ).
In the¯rst period, the politician observes the unit cost c L or c H ¡ we drop the regional subscript for convenience -and then chooses a level of provision conditional on between incumbent and challenger, but these will generate the same outcome as the¯rst one when there is no agency problem. 15 So, the voters are assumed to have a lexicographic second preference for the incumbent. This tie-breaking rule is not innocuous, as it implies that in equilibrium, the competent type behaves nonstrategically,with the non-competent deciding whether to imitate him or not: this is rather di®erent to Rogo®. cost. Voters observe level of public good and tax collection prior to election. Voters make an inference about their incumbent's type based on observed performance and compare it to prior beliefs about the type of the challenger, and re-elect their incumbent if the probability that he is "good" is at least ¼. The incumbent gets rent R if he is re-elected.
Given this, it is clear that good incumbents behave non-strategically, by choosing g L ; the optimal supply when cost is low. This is because if the voters observe g L ; ¿ L ; whatever strategy the "bad" incumbent follows, rational voters must conclude that the probability that the incumbent is "good" conditional on g L ; ¿ L is at least ¼:
As for the bad incumbent, if cost is low, he cannot do better than set (g L ; ¿ L ). If cost is high, he has two options. First, he can separate and set (g H ; ¿ H ): Second, he can pool and imitate the public good provision and taxation of a good type (g L ; ¿ L ) by borrowinĝ
If he separates, he reveals himself to be bad and thus loses the election.
If he pools with the good type, his type is not revealed and he will be re-elected.
His payo® to separating is therefore
that is, in the second period, the incumbent rationally anticipates that he will be replaced by a challenger who is competent with probability ¼: His payo® to pooling is
where, in the second period, the incumbent rationally anticipates that he will win the election, and that the debt incurred in order to pool must be repaid. So, bad incumbent will pool if W pool D¸W sep D which reduces to
On the RHS are the incentive and selection costs of pooling to all voters -and thus to the "bad" incumbent himself. The incentive cost, ¢ > 0 is the welfare loss of the distortion in public good supply. The selection cost, ¼q(W L ¡ W H ) is the loss in second-period expected utility from not replacing a bad incumbent. So, there is a pooling equilibrium if (3.1) holds, and a separating equilibrium otherwise.
Centralization
Now there is a single decision maker for both regions, and the tax rate that funds public good provision in both regions must be the same. The incumbent gets total rent 2R if he is re-elected. The analysis is the same as in the decentralization case, except for the¯rst-period pooling/separating decision of the bad incumbent. In particular, in the secondperiod , an incumbent of either type chooses optimal public good provision, conditional on cost, and the good incumbent chooses the same in the¯rst-period.
Now consider the bad incumbent in the¯rst-period. There are di®erent cost states to consider. In "symmetric" cost state 16 LL, the bad incumbent cannot do better than set (g L ; ¿ L ) in both regions and get re-elected. In state H H; the pooling constraint is (3.1) again, as the costs and bene¯ts of pooling are as in the decentralized case, scaled up by a factor of 2. In "asymmetric" cost states HL or LH, however, the choice to pool is di®erent. Here, if the bad incumbent separates, it is optimal to do so by providing the public good at the optimal level in each region, and setting a tax ¿ = 1 2
If he pools, he only need distort public good supply in the high-cost region which requires to borrowb. His payo® to pooling is therefore
Let us call this strategy partial pooling as it only prescribes pooling in the asymmetric cost state. The condition for pooling in the asymmetric cost state HL is W pool C¸W sep C ; which gives
Note that in an asymmetric cost state, pooling requires distortion in public good supply in only the high-cost region, so the incentive cost of pooling is
; the same as in the decentralized case, whereas the selection cost and the gain in rent to the incumbent are double their values in the decentralized case. Thus, comparing (3.1) and (3.2), we see that
we will say that there is partial pooling with centralization i.e. pooling only in asymmetric cost states, H L; LH; not in HH: The following Lemma summarizes the equilibrium con¯gurations.
Lemma 1: In the competence model, the equilibrium outcome has the following features: (a) with decentralization, there exists a separating equilibrium if R < R D and a pooling equilibrium if R¸R D ;(b) with centralization, there exists a separating equilibrium if R < R C ; a partial pooling equilibrium if R C · R < R D ; and a pooling equilibrium if R¸R D .
Welfare Comparisons
This is very simple. First, we note that because of the cost invariance assumption, the probability of any of the cost states HH; HL; LH; LL is the same under centralisation and decentralization. So, the expected payo® to a voter under both decentralization and centralization is the same, except in asymmetric costs states where also R C · R < R D : Then, decentralization gives voters a higher payo®, as they are unambiguously worse o® under pooling (both incentive and separation e®ects of pooling are negative). So, we can summarise as follows. Proposition 1. The outcome, and voter welfare with centralization and decentralization is the same, except if (i) the cost is high in one region and low in another, and (ii) R C · R < R D : In this event, the bad incumbent will separate under decentralization but will pool under centralization, making all voters better o® under decentralization.
The intuition underlying this result is the following. With centralization, politicians are held accountable to a larger extent, because to get re-elected they must produce a good record (the same record as a competent politician) in both regions. With decentralization only a good record at home su±ces to gain re-election. This gives extra incentive to pool with centralization. However pooling is bad in two respects. First, it induces ine±cient provision of public good (worse incentive). Second it reduces the chance of detecting and replacing bad politicians (worse selection). It then follows that centralization is unambiguously worse than decentralization.
Note that it is reelection that is the source of ine±ciency in this model. If politicians were not subject to reelection, they would not distort public good provision in the¯rst place. It follows that accountability is less desirable the greater the distortion in current incentive relative to the selection gain from reelection. 
What is the Key Feature of Centralization?
As remarked in the introduction, there are two key changes in the move to centralization: one policy-maker replaces two, and one common budget constraint (with a single tax) replaces two. Which of these generates the di®erence in outcome described in Proposition 1?
Assume for the moment that¯scal policy in one region is not observable by voters in the other region, and suppose that with centralization, the politician can now levy separate taxes on the two regions (non-uniform taxation). Given the additional degrees of freedom in setting tax, the incumbent has the new option to separate selectively in only one region. If the state is HL; he can provide public good levels (g H ; g L ) and set separate taxes (¿ H ; ¿ L ); exactly as under decentralization. This choice implies that all voters in the low-cost region will vote for the incumbent (he pools in this region with the good type), whereas in the high-cost region, he reveals himself to be incompetent, and so all will vote for the challenger. As both regions have equal population, with neutral electoral rule, the incumbent and challenger are elected with equal probability. So, in this case, his payo® is
where the last two term in the square brackets re°ects the fact that the incumbent is reelected or not with equal probability, enjoying payo®s 2(EW + R) or 2(¼W L + (1¡ ¼)EW ) in the following period respectively. If R is large enough that the incumbent wishes to regain o±ce, 18 as assumed above,
That is the incumbent prefers to separate selectively in one region preserving his chance of re-election in the other region, and separate taxes enables him to do so. Thus, with non-uniform taxes, the incumbent will pool i® W pool C¸f W sep C : After some rearrangement, we see that the condition for pooling is simply i® (3.1) holds, which is the same as in the case of decentralization. So, with separate taxes, decentralization and centralization are equivalent. The intuition is that uniform taxation makes it more costly to separate in one region, because then the incumbent's type is revealed to voters in both regions.
Of course, all this depends on the assumption that¯scal policy in one region is not observable by voters in the other region. If it is observable, then the incumbent cannot separate selectively in only one region, and then the welfare di®erence between centralization and decentralization will arise again with exactly the same outcome as for uniform taxes.
Benevolence
A key feature of the competence model is that it is the re-election motive that is the source of ine±cient public good provision. As a result, both the incentive and selection e®ects are associated with pooling lower voter welfare. As we now see, when politicians di®er in benevolence, the incentive e®ect associated with pooling raises voter welfarein order to get re-elected, the bad incumbent must control his predilection for diverting rent This con°ict makes for richer predictions -in particular, centralization can dominate decentralization from the point of view of the voter.
Decentralization
Again, we solve backward. In the second period, the honest policy-maker will provide optimal public good level g k given the cost realization c k ; and set tax ¿ k = c k g k : The dishonest policy-maker will just thus take maximum rent and set a tax of ¿ = r: So, all voters prefer the honest policy-maker.
In the¯rst-period, a good type incumbent in either region behaves non-strategically and so will make exactly the same policy choices as in the second period. 19 Moreover, when cost is high, the bad type always prefers to take maximum rent in the¯rst period, rather than imitates the good type in exchange for re-election: this is because discounting the future, it is better to take maximum rent now, and nothing later, rather than the opposite. This leaves the bad type in either region with three options when cost is low:
First, he can set (g H ; ¿ H ) and taker = g H (c H ¡ c L ) in the form of rents: call this the pooling strategy. Second, he can set g = 0; and take maximal rents, by setting ¿ = r :call this the separating strategy. Finally, he can randomise between these two alternatives, choosing the¯rst with probability¸: call this the hybrid strategy. His choice among these three strategies will depend on how each a®ects his probability of re-election. The key issue is how voters will vote if they observe (g H ; ¿ H ) : A voter's posterior belief that the incumbent is benevolent, conditional on this tax rate is
Let ¾ be the probability of re-election when (
Based on these strategies, there are then three possible types of equilibrium 20 : First, a pooling equilibrium, where the bad politician imitates the good one when the cost of 19 Here, as in the remainder of the paper, we must assume a non-strategic behavior of the "good" incumbent (in the¯rst period) or else,as Christian Schultz pointed out, there would be reasonable beliefs out-of-equilibrium inducing the good incumbent to distort public good supply in equilibrium to gain reelection in place of bad challenger. This assumption is implicit in Besley-Smart (2003) . 20 We ignore non-generic cases where behaviour can be di®erent in the two di®erent regions. public good provision is low, and is re-elected with probability 1 in that event. Second, a separating equilibrium where bad politician does not imitate the good one even when the cost of public good provision is low, and is re-elected with probability 0 in that event. Finally, a hybrid equilibrium, where he pools with probability 0 <¸< 1 and is reelected with probability 0 < ¾ < 1. We then have the following result, which is simply a restatement of Lemma 1 of Besley and Smart (2003): Proposition 2. With decentralization, a pooling equilibrium exists i® q¸0:5 and r¸(1 ¡ ±)r; a separating equilibrium exists i®r · (1 ¡ ±)r; and a hybrid equilibrium, with¸= q=(1 ¡ q) =¸D and ¾ = (r ¡r)=±r exists i® q < 0:5 andr¸(1 ¡ ±)r:
This result is illustrated in Figure 1 below:
Centralization
Solving backward, in the second-period; the benevolent policy-maker will provide optimal public good level in each region given local costs and charge uniform tax equal to average cost: The non-benevolent policy-maker will provide no public and take maximum rent, regardless of the cost con¯gurations. So, all voters prefer the benevolent policy-maker.
In the¯rst-period, the benevolent incumbent behaves non-strategically and so will make exactly the same policy choices as in the second period. As for the non-benevolent strategy, when cost is high in both regions HH the same argument as in the decentralized case implies that the non-benevolent type always prefers to take maximum rent in thē rst period, rather than imitate the benevolent type in exchange for re-election. This leaves the following cost con¯gurations with possible strategies (taking it as given that randomization between these strategies is also an option). However, in event LL, option (ii) with partial rent diversion, can be shown never to be optimal for the incumbent, and so we do not consider it further.
21 Let the probability of pooling in asymmetric state H L (or LH) be »; and the probability of pooling in symmetric state LL be¸: Then, given »;¸; voters' posterior belief that the incumbent is benevolent, conditional on the tax rate and public good supply must be:
The best response by voters is to re-elect only when this probability exceeds ¼: 21 Indeed if the incumbent pools when HL or LH we must have P (bj¿ H ;g H )¸¼ but then deviating when LL to take rent 2r preserves re-election and becauser¸(1 ¡ ±)r the bad type would prefer deviating. Alternatively, if the incumbent does not pool when HL or LH we must have P (b j¿ H ; g H ) = 1 which again implies that bad type would prefer deviating when LL to take rent 2r.
First, we look for an equilibrium with the maximum degree of pooling i.e.¸= » = 1: We call this equilibrium a full pooling equilibrium. Then
This can be an equilibrium only if Pr(b j¿ H ; g H )¸¼ (otherwise, the politician would prefer to take maximum rents, anticipating not being re-elected), which requires q1 = p 2: Note that the condition for full pooling here is stronger than the condition for pooling in the decentralized case (i.e. q¸1=2).
22 Also, it requires that whatever the cost realizations, the politician prefers to take the rent from pooling rather than go for maximum rent extraction. The rent from pooling is eitherr or 2r; sor + ±2r¸2r; orr¸2(1 ¡ ±)r is required. Comparing to Proposition 2, we see that a full pooling equilibrium is less likely than pooling with decentralization (the conditions on q andr are tighter).
The alternative for the incumbent is to pool only when the possible rents from doing so are large i.e. 2r: We call this a partial pooling equilibrium. This requires¸= 1; » = 0; in which case
This can be an equilibrium only if P (b j¿ H ; g H )¸¼, which requires q¸1=2: Note that in this case, the condition on q is the same as in the decentralized case. The equilibrium additionally requires that the rent from pooling 2r; satis¯es 2r + ±2r¸2r; orr¸(1¡ ±)r: Next, for a separating equilibrium to exist, it is necessary and su±cient that be the case that whatever the cost realizations, the bad politician prefers to take maximum rents 2r now rather than pool. This occurs when 2r > 2r + ±2r; orr < (1 ¡ ±)r:
Finally, we consider the hybrid equilibrium. This occurs i® q < 1=2 andr¸(1 ¡ ±)r: From the second condition, the bad politician always wants to pool: the problem is that if he does so fully (¸= » = 1) or even partially (¸= 1; » = 0), the voter's posterior belief that he is good will be too low for him to be re-elected. So, we need¸; » such that
The reason for this is that with centralization, tax ¿ H will only be set by the good incumbent if the cost is high in both regions, and the probability that this occurs is q 2 < q : consequently, q must be higher to compensate for the lower probability of this event.
Also, the bad politician gets a higher payo® from pooling in state LL than in state HL or LH : so, will set¸= 1 if possible. But setting¸= 1 in the above expression, we get 2q ¡ 1 = 2q(1 ¡ q)» which is impossible given q < 1=2: So, we have » = 0 (no pooling in state HL or LH) and¸= q 2 (1 ¡ q) 2 =¸C Then, the bad politician must be indi®erent between rent extraction and pooling in state LL;this requires 2r + ¾±2r = 2r which requires ¾ = r ¡r ±r So, in the hybrid equilibrium, the probability of re-election is as in BS with decentralization: but, the probability of pooling is lower with centralization:
as q < 0:5: We can summarise the discussion as follows:
Proposition 3. With centralization, a full pooling equilibrium exists i® q¸1= p 2 and r¸2(1¡±)r; a partial pooling equilibrium exists i® q¸1=2 andr¸(1¡ ±)r; a separating equilibrium exists i®r · (1¡±)r; and a hybrid equilibrium, with¸= q 2 =(1¡q) 2 =¸C and ¾ = (r ¡r)=±r exists i® q < 0:5 andr¸(1 ¡ ±)r:
Comparing equilibria with centralization and decentralization, we can make the following observations. The conditions for separating and hybrid equilibria are the same. The condition for pooling equilibrium is also the same but centralization involves two different degrees of pooling: full pooling when both the rent from pooling and the probability of high cost are high enough; otherwise pooling is partial. The equilibrium con¯guration under centralization is illustrated below.
Welfare Comparisons
Comparing Propositions 2 and 3, we can derive quite complete results on the e®ect of centralization on voter welfare. We measure voter welfare as the sum of voter utilities in the two regions (no regional welfare distribution concern). We proceed by making the comparison separately for di®erent regions of the parameter space, in particular, the set of feasible values of q;r; as suggested by Figures 1-2 . Case 1.r < (1 ¡ ±)r: Here, only a separating equilibrium exists with either centralization and decentralization. Then the outcome is identical with decentralization and centralization, so voter welfare is identical. Case 2.r¸2(1 ¡ ±)r , q¸1=X2: In this case, when the cost is the same in both regions -states (H; H) or (L; L), the two types of incumbent act in the same way under centralization and decentralization and so the outcomes are the same. On the other hand, if the state is HL or LH; with decentralization the bad incumbent in only the low-cost region pools, whereas with centralization, the (single) incumbent always pools. So, the incentive e®ect is stronger with centralization, but the selection e®ect is weaker.
Case 3.
(1 ¡ ±)r ·r · 2(1 ¡ ±)r; or 0:5 · q · 1=X2; or both. In this case, when the cost is the same in both regions -states HH or LL¡ the two types of incumbent act in the same way under centralization and decentralization and so the outcomes are the same. On the other hand, if the state is H L or LH; with decentralization the bad incumbent in only the low-cost region pools, whereas with centralization, the (single) incumbent never pools. So, the incentive e®ect is weaker with centralization, but the selection e®ect is stronger.
Case 4:r¸(1 ¡ ±)r; q < 0:5: In this case, when the cost is high in both regions -state H H¡ the two types of incumbent act in the same way under centralization and decentralization i.e. bad incumbents always take maximum rents and so the outcomes are the same. On the other hand, if the state is HL or LH; with decentralization the bad incumbent in only the low-cost region pools with probability¸D, whereas with centralization, the (single) incumbent never pools (since with hybrid equilibrium we have » = 0). So, in these two asymmetric states, the incentive e®ect is weaker with centralization, but the selection e®ect is stronger. Finally, if the state is LL; with decentralization, both bad incumbents pool with probability¸2 D ; both separate with probability (1 ¡¸D) 2 ; and one separates with probability 2¸D(1 ¡¸D): With centralization, the single incumbent pools with probability¸C which is less than¸D. In this case, the change in the incentive and selection e®ects with centralization goes again in the same direction: worse incentive (due to less expected pooling) but better selection. So, we have already established that incentive and selection e®ects may be either stronger or weaker with centralization. Of course, merely identifying how the incentive and selection e®ects di®er following a switch from decentralization to centralization (or vice versa) is just the¯rst step. The welfare gains associated with increased incentive and selection e®ects have to be evaluated and compared. This is straightforward but involves some algebra. The results are summarised in the following Proposition, proved in the Appendix: The intuition is simple. In the full pooling case, for example, the selection e®ect is stronger with decentralization (i.e. it is more likely that the bad incumbent is voted out). The expected discounted bene¯t of replacing the bad incumbent by the challenger is ±[¼EW + (1 ¡ ¼)(¡r) ¡ (¡r)] = ±¼(EW + r): However, this gain is made at the cost of removing the incentive to pool of the incumbent in the¯rst period, which costs W H +r: So, the overall gain to decentralization is ±¼(EW +r)¡(W H + r) which is positive when ±¼¸W H +r EW+r : The case with partial pooling is just the other way around with more pooling in decentralization and thus less selection. Interestingly the case with hybrid equilibrium turns out to be the same as the partial pooling case. To see why this is, note that in spite of the apparent di®erence in the incumbent behavior, decentralization involves in expected terms more pooling and less selection. In particular, in both hybrid and partial pooling there is no pooling with centralization when cost state is asymmetric wherever pooling arises in the low cost region with decentralization.
The basic lesson of proposition 5 is that decentralization need not improve accountability. Actually it suggests rather that centralization is equally likely to dominate.
What is the Key Feature of Centralization?
As the case of varying competence, when centralization occurs, there are two changes: (i) there is a single, rather than two, policy-makers: (ii) there is a single, rather than two, budget constraints. Which of these changes generates the di®erence between the two cases?
Again, consider a situation where the single policy-maker sets a di®erent tax in each of the two regions. Further assume as we have done so far that voters only observe tax and public good provision in their own region. Then in an asymmetric cost state HL or LH; the non-benevolent incumbent will always separate in the high-cost region, and he has two options in the low cost region. The¯rst is to separate by setting g = 0; ¿ = 1:The second is to pool by setting g = g H ; ¿ = ¿ H : Pooling implies that all voters in the low-cost region will vote for the incumbent, whereas in the high-cost region, all will vote for the challenger. As both regions are assumed to have equal population, the outcome is that by separating selectively in only one region, the incumbent is re-elected with probability 0.5, whereas with complete separation, the incumbent is re-elected with probability 0.
A pooling equilibrium requires that Pr(b j¿ H ; g H )¸¼; which now requires that q¸0:5 as in the decentralized case. Moreover, the incumbent has payo® from selective separation ofr + r + 0:5±(2r); whereas from complete separating, he has payo® 2r + 0: So, he will pool ifr¸(1 ¡ ±)r; as in the decentralized case. This argument establishes that without fungibility, and with voters in one region unable to observe the¯scal policy in the other region, centralization and decentralization are equivalent.
Correlated Costs and Yardstick Competition
We now introduce the possibility of correlated cost shocks. We¯rst consider how this a®ects the outcome with centralization in Section 5.1 below. Whether correlation a®ects the outcome with decentralization turns on whether we suppose that voters in region i can observe the¯scal policy choices of region j: If they can, then yardstick competition is possible, and as emphasized by Besley and Smart(2003) . This may work in favour of decentralization (but does not necessarily do so). So, we then analyse the case of decentralization with yardstick competition in Section 5. compares centralization and decentralization with correlated costs.
Centralization with Correlated Cost Shocks
We model correlation as follows. The joint probability distribution over possible states of the world is:
where ½ 2 [0; 1] is the correlation coe±cient. So, with perfectly correlated cost shocks, Pr(HH) = q; Pr(LL) = 1 ¡ q and Pr(HL) = Pr(LH) = 0: With decentralization, if voters cannot observe policy choice in the other region, then the outcome is the same as with independent shocks i.e. Proposition 2 still applies. With centralization, however, the outcome is a®ected by correlation, even when voters have limited information. The possible types of equilibrium are the same (full pooling, partial pooling, separating, hybrid), but the condition determining whether a full or partial pooling equilibrium occurs does depend on ½; as does the probability of pooling in the hybrid equilibrium. Formally, our characterization of equilibrium with correlation is now as follows (see Appendix for the proof):
Proposition 5. With centralization and correlated shocks, a full pooling equilibrium exists i® (i)r¸2(1 ¡ ±)r and (ii) q¸q(½); where q(½) is strictly decreasing in ½ with q(0) = 1= p 2; q(1) = 1=2: The conditions for partial pooling, separating and hybrid equilibria are the same as without correlation. However, the probability of pooling in the hybrid equilibrium is higher with correlation¸(½) =
; but the probability of re-election keeps the same ½:
So, with correlation, full pooling is easier to achieve in equilibrium than with independent cost shocks.
The intuition is simple. When q > 1=2, the higher the correlation ½, the more likely is the state HH than is any one of the other three states. But in state H H the record (¿ H ; g H ) will only be produced by a benevolent type, whereas in any one of the other three states, it will be set by a dishonest type (with full pooling). So, other things equal, the higher ½; the higher Pr(b j¿ H ; g H ); and consequently q can be lower while satisfying the re-election condition Pr(b j¿ H ; g H )¸¼:
Note¯nally that the welfare result, Proposition 4, applies as stated to the case of correlated costs. Indeed, the proof in the Appendix holds for any correlation rate ½ 2 (0; 1): The only di®erence is that in the statement of cases 2 and 3, the critical value of q; 1= p 2; is replaced by q(½);and in the statement of case 4 the probability of pooling in hybrid equilibrium¸C is replaced by¸(½):
Decentralization with Yardstick Competition
Note that if relative performance is not observable by voters in the case of decentralization, Proposition 5 still applies to the comparison of voter welfares under decentralization and centralization. However, of course with correlation, the probability of asymmetric cost states, and thus the di®erence in expected voter welfare between the two regimes, is smaller than without correlation.
However, it is equally plausible that performance comparison is possible with decentralization, and indeed, it is often stated in the policy literature that the possibility of performance comparison is one of the key advantages of decentralization.
However we rule out strategic interaction between regions by assuming that each incumbent does not observe, or cannot condition policy on, the shock in the other region and the type of the other incumbent. We also assume that b r¸(1 ¡ ±)r (i.e. no separating The welfare comparison is the same as before when yardstick competition is not binding. So we shall compare welfare when the yardstick e®ect is present. We¯rst restrict attention to pooling with yardstick competition. 24 
Welfare Comparisons
We perform welfare comparison for equilibrium preserving yardstick competition. If yardstick comparison does not a®ect the equilibrium behavior of incumbents in period 1, it will however modify his probability of reelection in cost state LL. This is because the bad incumbent pooling on ¿ H is no longer re-elected if the other incumbent is good, ¾(¿ H ; ¿ L ) = 0. In this event, the selection gain from voting out bad type is W 0 + r which occurs with probability 2¼(1¡¼). For other cost states HH and HL (or LH) probabilities of reelection are the same: with cost H the bad incumbent takes maximum rent and is voted out irrespective of the outcome in other region; with cost L the bad incumbent is re-elected when pooling on ¿ H and is reelected independently of the outcome in the other region. 25 So as before, when comparing centralization and decentralization, there is no welfare di®erence in cost state HH, and the welfare di®erence in either cost state HL or LH keeps the same (say,EW D ¡ EW C ). Using these facts, the expected welfare di®erence between decentralization and centralization is 2¼(1 ¡ ¼)(W 0 + r) in cost state LL with probability (1 ¡ q) 2 + ½q(1 ¡ q);and is EW D ¡ EW C in cost states HL (or LH) with probability 2(q(1 ¡ q) ¡ ½q(1 ¡ q)): Let EW Y C be the expected welfare with yardstick competition, then welfare di®erence with centralization is
where the¯rst term (possibly negative) is the original welfare di®erence (without yardstick competition) and the second term (which is always positive) is the selection gain 24 Note that in this case, the bad incumbent is less likely to be re-elected when pooling, which changes the threshold for no separating equilibrium to b r¸(1 ¡ ±(1 ¡ ¼ + ¼(1 ¡ ½)q))r (which is strictly greater than (1 ¡ ±)r and increasing with ½). In the following we suppose this condition holds.
25 This is true also if the outcome is r in the other region because then voters know that cost in that region is H and with positive correlation Pr(g j¿ H ; r ) > Pr(g j¿ H ; ¿ H ) > ¼:
from yardstick competition. As correlation ½ increases, more weight is put on the second term relative to the¯rst, making decentralization with yardstick competition more likely to dominate centralization. Thus we have:
Proposition 7. In Case of pooling equilibrium with yardstick competition, the expected welfare with decentralization increases with correlation and there exists correlation rate ½ ¤ < 1 such that decentralization dominates if ½ > ½ ¤ and centralization dominates if
It remains to see the e®ect of yardstick comparison on hybrid equilibrium. When q · b q(½); the incumbent faces the re-election rule with yardstick competition, ¾(¿ H ; ¿ L ) = 0. To preserve chances of re-election, the incumbent can use mixed strategy. This requires Pr(b j¿ H ; ¿ L ) = ¼ which implies
Thus the probability of pooling decreases with correlation. Our next proposition establishes that in case of hybrid equilibrium, yardstick competition makes decentralization less likely to dominate: Proposition 8. In Case of hybrid equilibrium with yardstick competition, decentralization dominates if and only if ±¼ ·°(½)
Therefore the previous conclusion (of proposition 7) that yardstick competition offers decentralization the best chance of dominating centralization is no longer true with hybrid equilibrium. The reason is that to preserve chance of re-election bad incumbents optimally respond to yardstick comparison by pooling less and thereby reduces the relative advantage of decentralization over centralization (viz. more pooling with less selection).
Related Literature and Conclusions
Related Literature
There are a number of literatures related to the topic of this paper. First, as mentioned, there are two papers, namely Seabright (1996) and Bardhan and Mookherjee(2000) which directly address the relationship between¯scal decentralization and accountability. However, both papers have their limitations in the modelling of the key concept of accountability. Seabright's paper posits a number of regions, and that the welfare of all the residents of any region is determined by policy choice and a region-speci¯c taste shock, which is uncorrelated across regions. The electoral rule is majoritarian: with centralization, the national policy-maker must capture the votes of at least a majority of regions, 26 and with decentralization, the regional policy-maker must capture at least a majority of districts within regions. 27 In this setting, a national policy-maker is less accountable than a set of regional policy-makers, as to be re-elected, the former only needs to choose policy in such a way that a majority of regions prefer the incumbent, whereas the latter needs to choose policy in such a way that all the residents within a region prefer the incumbent. Therefore his analysis relies on heterogenous tastes across regions and homogenous taste within region, and the dominance of decentralization emerges naturally as a preference matching device. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) focus on lobbying by an interest group in a setting of Downsian political competition between two parties (that is, parties can precommit to policy positions ex ante) The focus is on the amount of lobbying and the consequent distortion in the policy outcome away from the preference of the median voter under centralization and decentralization. One limitation of the model is that it is not completely micro-founded, because campaign contributions are simply assumed to a®ect the voting decisions of uninformed voters. As the work of Prat (2002a,b) shows, the informational role of campaign contributions can be explicitly modelled. Another problem is that in their framework,it is di±cult to make explicit welfare comparisons between centralization and decentralization, as voters are heterogenous.
Second, this paper builds on the large literature on electoral accountability that can be traced back to the work of Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) . The closest to our work is the important recent paper by Besley and Smart (2003) : indeed, we use an extension of their model as a vehicle for our analysis. We should stress that in their paper, they do not consider centralized decision-making: their benchmark is decentralization without "competition" between regions, and then the impact on selection and incentive e®ects. of introducing either tax or yardstick competition is studied 28 . A further related contribution 26 In fact, Seabright allows for a more general electoral rule where some arbirary fraction of electoral districts must be won in order to win the election overall. 27 Given that the shock to welfare is identical for all residents within a region, either all voters will vote for the incumbent, or none will. So, the precise form of the electoral rule does not matter here. 28 See also Carillo. and Mariotti (2001) .
is Belle°amme and Hindriks (2003) who assess the e®ect of yardstick competition in a di®erent context where bad incumbents distort decision to get re-elected (they use ine±cient sneaky methods of redistribution instead of more transparent e±cient methods). One consequence of this approach is that yardstick competition can never hurt the voters, because bad incumbents are more easily detected (selection gain) and so they are less likely to distort ine±ciently their policy choice for re-election purpose (incentive gain).
There is also a set of political models of corruption assessing the relative performance of di®erent electoral rules (majoritarian rule versus proportional representation). In Myerson (1993) voting behavior is endogenous to the electoral rule but corruption is assumed to be an exogenous feature of each politician. The ability of voters to hold corrupt incumbents accountable is worse with the majoritarian rule as voters are less willing to switch their vote on a "good" challenger who is perceived to have little chance of winning. Persson and Tabellini (1999) compare political bevior under proportional representation in a nationwide district and the majority rule in a number of local districts. Competition is stronger with local majority rule as politicians are interested to win a majority, not national-wide, but in the marginal districts containing more swing voters. As these voters are more responsive to policy outcome, politicians are more disciplined and divert less rents.
Finally, there is a large body of literature on decentralization within organizations. The basic trade-o® is between delegation of decision-making to better informed agents and the associated loss of control and agency costs (since informed agents may not have all the incentives to act in the best interests of the delegating authority). The optimal organizational form emerges from this simple trade o®. For a long time it has been a challenge to explain decentralization with this framework. The reason is that from the "revelation principle" any decentralized organization can be replicated by a centralized one in which all agents with di®erent sets of information report their information to a center who then makes all the relevant decision (Myerson(1982) . This revelation principle has for a long time been the cornerstone of the weak superiority of centralization over decentralization. However recent theoretical developments have shown that relaxing some of the underlying assumptions can create a preference for decentralization. For example if the center cannot commit not to renegotiate the initial contract after agents have reported their information, then decentralization is an e®ective commitment device by preventing ex-post opportunistic renegotiations from the center (Beaudry and Poitevin(1995) ). When agents can collude when reporting their information to the center, then decentralization by creating a con°ict of interest between agents can prevent any collusion and again decentralization to informed agents may be optimal (La®ont and Martimort(1998) ). When communication is costly, decentralization may also be optimal because it reduces commu-nication costs (see Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein(1997) ).
However, the model of this paper is rather di®erent to the contractual approach. First, models of electoral incentives (as is ours) take an incomplete contracting approach. First delegation of decision making to politicians. The "right" policy choice depends on nonveri¯able information about the state of the environment, that cannot be contracted upon ex-ante. Consequently it must be delegated to politicians, thereby creating an incentive problem since giving any residual right to an agent to make collective choices opens up the possibility of opportunistic behavior and abuse of power. Second, the decision maker is selected by election: the politician is not controlled by a contract but by the public opinion. If he wants to remain in o±ce, he must win elections.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have considered the impact of di®erent assignments of¯scal powers (centralized and decentralized) on accountability of politicians. There are just two di®erences between centralization and decentralization. With decentralization there is a distinct decision maker in each jurisdiction and separate taxation. With centralization it is the same decision maker for both jurisdictions with uniform taxation and common budget constraint. Politicians are either "good" or "bad". Given homogenous electorate there is no ambiguity about what is a good incumbent. As for a bad incumbent we consider two possibilities: either the bad incumbent is incompetent or dishonest. For each case we study which organizational form performs better in terms of its ability to screen and discipline politicians. Our main results are that (i) in the competence case, decentralization unambiguously dominates, and (ii) in the honesty case, centralization and decentralization have con°icting e®ects on accountability, in the sense that one institutional form is better to discipline when the other is better to screen politicians. A distinctive feature of centralization in our analysis is to extend accountability to multiple constituencies with whom the politician may or may not be congruent subject to an overall budget constraint. In contrast, decentralization makes politicians only answerable to their local constituency. 
With probability ¼(1 ¡ ¼); there will be a good incumbent in the high-cost region and a bad in the low-cost region : the good generates W H in period 1 and EW in the second, and the bad will pool, generating W H in period 1 and ¡r in the second. Aggregate voter welfare is therefore 2W H + ±(EW ¡ r):
With probability ¼(1 ¡ ¼); there will be a bad incumbent in the high-cost region and a good in the low-cost region: the bad will separate, generating ¡r in period 1 and being replaced, so generating W 0 in the second period; and the good will provide W L in period 1 and EW in the second. Aggregate voter welfare is therefore W H ¡ r + ±(W 0 + EW ):
So, expected voter welfare with decentralization is
Now consider expected voter welfare with centralization. Recall that the cost state is HL: With probability ¼; there is a good incumbent, who will provide voter welfare W H + W L in period 1. This incumbent will be re-elected, producing expected voter
in the next period. With probability 1 ¡ ¼; there is a bad incumbent, who will pool and provide 2W H , and who will be re-elected, taking maximum rent 2r. So, expected payo® under centralization is
Consider¯rst the di®erence in¯rst-period payo®s only-this is the incentive e®ect:
The incentive e®ect is negative, as there is less pooling with decentralization, and thus more rent-extraction. Now consider the the di®erence in second-period payo®s only-this is the selection e®ect:
This is positive, as de-selection of bad incumbents is more likely with decentralization. Overall, we get:
So, decentralization dominates if
which reduces to ±¼¸W H + r EW + r (ii) The proof for partial pooling case closely follows that of the full pooling case, and so is omitted.
(iii) For hybrid equilibrium we consider¯rst di®erence in¯rst-period welfares (incentive e®ects). If the state is HH incumbents act the same with centralization and decentralization and there is no welfare di®erence. When the state is HL or LH (with probability 2 Pr(HL)) the bad incumbent separates with centralization but pools under decentralization in low cost region with probability¸D producing incentive gain of W H + r in the low cost region. When the state is LL, the probability of pooling di®ers: from proposition 5, there is less pooling with centralization¸(½) <¸D producing incentive gain of (¸D ¡¸(½)) (W H + r) in each region. So¯rst-period welfare di®erence is
Turning to second-period, when state is HH incumbents act the same with the same chance of reelection and second-period welfare is the same. When state is LL incumbents pool with di®erent probabilities (¸(½) <¸D) but have the same chance of reelection ¾ and so again there is no second-period welfare di®erence. When state is HL or LH, with decentralization bad incumbent in low cost region pools and is reelected with probability ¾ whereas bad incumbent separates with centralization and is voted out. So centralization is more likely to vote out bad incumbent producing selection gain from centralization of ¾(W 0 + r). Also, when state is HL or LH good type chooses intermediate tax ¿ HL with centralization and is reelected, whereas with decentralization good type in high cost region is only re-elected with probability ¾. So centralization is also less likely to vote out good incumbent producing selection gain of (1 ¡ ¾)(EW ¡ W 0 ): It follows that second-period welfare di®erence is
Overall, we get that decentralization dominates if : First, note that the options for the bad incumbent as in the independent case. As before, let the probability of pooling in asymmetric state HL (or LH) be »; and the probability of pooling in symmetric state LL be¸: Then, using formulae (5.1), voters' posterior belief that the incumbent is benevolent, conditional on the tax rate and public good level are the same as without cost correlation, except that now This can be an equilibrium only if Pr(g j¿ H )¸¼ (otherwise, the bad politician would prefer to take maximum rents, anticipating not being re-elected), which requires which requires from (A.2) after some simpli¯cation that
So, the critical value of q above which a pooling equilibrium exists solves 2(1 ¡ ½)q 2 + 2½q = 1 =) q = q(½) (A.
3)
It is easily checked that 1=2 · q(½) · 1= p 2 and is decreasing in ½ with q(0) = 1= p 2 and q(1) = 1=2. We also require that whatever the cost realizations, the bad politician prefers to take the rent from pooling rather than go for maximum rent extraction. But this condition is una®ected by the degree of cost correlation, and so isr¸2(1 ¡ ±)r as before.
Now consider the partial pooling equilibrium. This requires¸= 1; » = 0: Then, from (A.1),
Again, this can be an equilibrium only if P (b j¿ H ; g H )¸¼ which requires q 2 + ½q(1 ¡ q)¸(1 ¡ q) 2 + ½q(1 ¡ q) which reduces to q¸1=2: We also requirer¸(1 ¡ ±)r as before. Turning now to the conditions for separating equilibrium, it must be the case that whatever the cost realizations, the bad PM prefers to take maximum rents 2r now rather than pool. This occurs when 2r > 2r + ±2r; orr < (1 ¡ ±)r; a condition which is clearly independent of cost correlations, so the conditions for this equilibrium are una®ected.
Finally, the hybrid equilibrium. When q < 1=2 andr¸(1 ¡ ±)r, the bad incumbent wants to pool but cannot be re-elected if he pools with probability 1. Hence, for such a equilibrium, we need¸; » < 1 such that Because the bad incumbent prefers to pool when the state is LL than when HL or LH, he will set¸= 1 if possible. But with¸= 1 we get 2q ¡ 1 = 2»(q(1 ¡ q) ¡ ½q(1 ¡ q)) which is impossible given q < 1=2; » > 0. So » = 0 anḑ
This requires
as required. ¤ Proof of Proposition 6. By de¯nition, a re-election rule with yardstick competition has the following feature, ¾(¿ H ; ¿ H ) > ¾(¿ H ; ¿ L ). The associated levels of public good provision is suppressed for clarity. Since only benevolent type will choose ¿ L , we also have ¾(¿ L ; x) = 1 for x = ¿ ; ¿ H ; ¿ L . So, there are two possibilities for pooling by the bad incumbent.
1. Pr(b j¿ H ; ¿ H ); Pr(b j¿ H ; ¿ L )¸¼: In this case, the re-election rule has no yardstick competition, ¾(¿ H ; ¿ H ) = ¾(¿ H ; ¿ L ) = 1 and the incumbent in each region will be reelected if he pools. 
Proof of Proposition 8.
The proof follows closely the proof of Proposition 4 for hybrid equilibrium; where it is shown that decentralization dominates if :
±¼ · ·¸D + Pr(LL) Pr(HL) (¸D ¡¸(½))¸W H + r EW + r where¸D ¡¸(½) is the di®erence in the probability of pooling between decentralization and centralization. It was then established that the expression in bracket is equal to one. The e®ect of yardstick competition on the hybrid equilibrium is to reduce the probability of pooling from¸D to¸Y C so that the condition above becomes Pr(HL) (¸D ¡¸(½)) = 1 and so the condition for decentralization to dominate is more stringent with yardstick e®ect. It is easily checked that°(½) is decreasing with°(½) < 1 for all ½ and°(½) < 0 above a critical level ½ ¤ < 1;as required ¤
